Rethinking the Binary Federal Theory: A Search for the EU’s and ASEAN’s Place in the Confederal-Federal Dichotomy by Fran Marko Stojković
61CYELP 16 [2020] 61-93
RETHINKING THE BINARY FEDERAL THEORY: 
A SEARCH FOR THE EU’S AND ASEAN’S PLACE 
IN THE CONFEDERAL-FEDERAL DICHOTOMY
 Fran Marko StojkoviÊ*
Abstract: This paper argues that the traditional binary federal theory, 
which distinguishes between concepts of confederation and federa-
tion, is not adequate for explaining the legal nature of various unions 
of states. In reaching such a conclusion, the paper fi rst defi nes the 
traditional federal theory. It presents how both the concepts of a fed-
eration and a confederation, with all their associated characteristics, 
derive from the old absolute understanding of sovereignty. The uni-
tary constitutional theory, which is the only constitutional theory com-
patible with this notion of federalism, is also explained. Afterwards, 
the legal structures of two very different integrational projects, the 
EU and ASEAN, are examined in the light of the traditional federal 
theory with the aim of concluding whether these entities are confeder-
ations or federations. It is suggested how and why ASEAN easily fi ts 
into the confederal category, while the EU defi es both the federal and 
confederal box. From the results of such an analysis, a conclusion is 
drawn on why the theory is inadequate to explain the legal nature of 
certain unions, such as the EU. It is claimed that the theory, which is 
based on the idea of absolute sovereignty, has failed to readapt itself 
to the existence of unions of states in which absolute sovereignty is 
wholly absent. The paper concludes with a brief discussion on how 
the theory should be reformed to better fi t the legal reality. It is sug-
gested that a more spectral view on federalism is needed, either some 
brand-new one or the one conceptualised by James Madison back in 
the 18th century.   
Keywords: sovereignty, confederation, federation, federal theory, Eu-
ropean Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
1 Introduction
During my studies at the University of Zagreb, I came across the 
concepts of ‘federation’ and ‘confederation’ on multiple occasions. These 
concepts were taught in three of my mandatory classes (General Theory 
of Law, Constitutional Law, and Public International Law),1 each time in 
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quite a similar manner.2 The class textbooks mostly revolved around two 
central points. First, that any union of states is either a confederation or 
federation, depending on whether its basis is an international agreement 
or a constitution. Second, that there are certain sets of characteristics 
which confederations and federations usually possess.
However, this settled confederal-federal way of teaching faces a 
challenge with regards to the European Union. The characteristics of 
the legal structure of the EU diverge from those traditionally prescribed 
for confederations or federations, making it hard to categorise it within 
the confederal-federal dichotomy. The legal textbooks, used during the 
course of my studies, reconciled these peculiar EU characteristics with 
the traditional federal teaching in various ways. While some proclaimed 
that the EU still falls into the confederal category,3 others just stated 
that the EU represents a unique entity, without questioning the confed-
eral-federal distinction as a whole.4 
The lack of a single answer to what the EU is from the federal stand-
point is a refl ection of the general lack of consensus regarding the legal 
nature of the EU, a topic which legal scholars have been arguing over 
since the very creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. Over 
the years, this debate has taken many different forms. From the 1960s 
to the 1980s it mostly revolved around the question of whether or not 
EU law5 is a subspecies of the law of international organisations.6 In 
the 1980s the debate shifted to the founding treaties and the question 
of whether the treaties are of a constitutional nature.7 Regardless of the 
sub question on which the debate is centred, the contrasting views on 
the legal nature of the EU have remained today as they were at the begin-
ning of the integration. This paper aims to make a small contribution to 
the course of this everlasting debate by observing the EU’s legal nature 
from the federal standpoint. However, in contrast to the above-mentioned 
ZidaniË, Dimitris Nikolaidis, and Petar ZubiÊ as well as to two anonymous reviewers for 
their comments that have greatly improved the original draft. All errors remain mine. DOI: 
10.3935/cyelp.16.2020.378.
1 The textbook used for my General Theory of Law class was Berislav PeriÊ, Država i pravni 
sustav (Informator 1994), for my Constitutional Law class it was  Branko Smerdel, Ustavno 
ureenje europske Hrvatske (Narodne novine 2013) and the textbook for my Public Interna-
tional Law class was Juraj Andrassy and others, Meunarodno parvo 1 (©kolska knjiga 2010).
2 An alternative view on federalism is presented in Smerdel (n 1) 215-219. However, it is 
clear that the author favours the traditional federal theory over an alternative one. 
3 Juraj Andrassy and others, Meunarodno pravo 2 (©kolska knjiga 2012).
4 Smerdel (n 1) 204-206.
5 Back then known as Community law.
6 Jacques Ziller ‘The Nature of European Union Law’ (2011) 5 <https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1919481> accessed 26 July 2020.
7 ibid, 6.
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textbooks, which only try to fi nd the EU’s place in the confederal-federal 
dichotomy, aim of this paper is to take a step back and focus on another 
frequently asked question: is this traditional federal theory suitable for 
observing the legal nature of any union of states in the fi rst place.
The paper argues that the traditional federal theory is not suffi cient 
to explain the legal nature of either the EU or any other similar legal en-
tity, and that, as such, it needs to be reformed.
The importance of this argument is that it could constitute the cor-
nerstone of a more appropriate framework for examining the phenomena 
of interstate integration. Detailed assessment of the shortcomings of the 
traditional federal theory is a suitable base for building a new under-
standing of federalism, one that can better explain the legal nature of 
the EU or any other union of states, past, present, or future, which falls 
outside the traditional confederal or federal boxes. The new understand-
ing can also help resolve (or at least help us understand) confl icts, such 
as the contested question of the supremacy of EU law,8 which are, in my 
opinion, the direct consequence of observing the European legal order 
from an inadequate traditional federal standpoint.
The conclusion that the traditional federal theory is not suffi cient to 
explain the legal nature of certain legal entities is here reached by ex-
amining and comparing the legal structure of two very different regional 
integration projects: the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (hereinafter: ASEAN). 
There are two main reasons why the conclusion is pursued by com-
paring the EU to ASEAN and not to any other union of states. The fi rst 
is comparability. Since, according to the traditional federal theory, the 
EU falls into the confederal category, another confederation was chosen 
over any federal state to make the comparison easier, clearer, and more 
accessible. This choice excluded unions such as the Federal Republic 
of Germany or the United States of America. The second reason is con-
federal dissimilarity. From all the possible confederations, ASEAN was 
selected because its confederal structure is very different from that of the 
EU.9 The comparison between the two clearly highlights certain absurdi-
ties resulting from labelling both ASEAN and the EU as confederations.
The paper is divided into three further sections. Section 2 gives a 
brief overview of the traditional federal theory and the unitary constitu-
tional theory which together are key for understanding the traditional 
8 This confl ict is discussed in detail in the third section of this paper. 
9 ASEAN is not the only appropriate confederation for this analysis. The conclusion pre-
sented in this article can also be reached by comparing the EU to legal entities such as the 
African Union or the Southern African Development Community.
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notion of federalism. This section shows how the concepts of federations 
and confederations, together with all the attributed traditional charac-
teristics, are rooted in the old understanding of sovereignty as an abso-
lute and indivisible power. In the third section, the legal structures of 
ASEAN and the EU are analysed from the traditional federal standpoint. 
From this analysis two things are evident. Firstly, ASEAN easily fi ts into 
the confederal category since it is constructed on the idea of the absolute 
sovereignty of the member states, much like the concept of confederation 
itself. Secondly, the fi nding that the EU’s place in the confederal-federal 
dichotomy is more diffi cult because absolute sovereignty, the concept on 
which the whole traditional federal theory is based, is wholly absent from 
European reality. The paper concludes that four parts of the traditional 
federal theory (its base, the confederal-federal dichotomy, understanding 
of the legal structure and constitutionalism) are in a crisis, primarily 
because the theory has failed to readapt itself to the existence of unions, 
such as the EU, which are not based on the idea of absolute sovereignty. 
Different suggestions are proposed as possible solutions to this crisis, 
such as the idea that the theory should be reformed by either accept-
ing Madison’s conception of federalism or by creating some other new 
non-binary classifi cation.
2 The world from the traditional federal standpoint 
The concept of federalism can be used to advocate diametrically 
opposite purposes depending on the political and historical context. In 
Catalonia today, the federalisation of Spain is favoured by those cam-
paigning for greater autonomy of the region.10 In contrast, in Yugosla-
via, federalism was an instrument for bringing and keeping a culturally 
and nationally diverse populace under one central power.11 Regardless 
of the purpose of the concept, federalism is a phenomenon that has ex-
isted from as early as Ancient Greece12 and has always implied the ex-
istence of (at least) two levels of government. However, how we perceive 
and understand this phenomenon largely depends on which standpoint 
we observe it from. The aim of this section is to give a clear picture of 
the federal standpoint that originated in 16th century Europe. This tradi-
tional standpoint has shaped the legal minds of European scholars (and 
10 Francesco Violi, ‘Our Proposal for Catalonia: Federal Spain’ (My Country Europe, 1 Oc-
tober 2017) <https://mycountryeurope.com/opinions/catalonia-federal-spain/> accessed 
22 December 2019.
11 For more information on the federalism in the early days of Yugoslavia, see Joseph Fran-
kel, ‘Federalism in Yugoslavia’ (1955) 49 The American Political Science Review 416.
12  On federalism in Ancient Greece, see Hans Beck and Peter Funke (eds), Federalism in 
Greek Antiquity (1st edn, CUP 2015).
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scholars originating from countries previously colonised by Europeans) 
for centuries and continues to do so today. 
Traditional federal theory has its roots in conceptual defi nitions 
which ‘precede and prevail over any empirical legal analysis (of the ex-
isting unions)’.13 The most important conceptual defi nition for the theo-
ry concerns the principle of sovereignty. Jean Bodin, a French political 
philosopher, was the fi rst to defi ne sovereignty in his Les Six livres de 
la République in 1576 as ‘an  absolute, indivisible and perpetual power 
of giving law and issuing commands to all in general and to each in 
particular’.14 In France, which back then was an absolute monarchy, 
such power could only reside within one institution − the king.15 From 
Bodin’s initial conception, the principle later evolved in two directions. 
In continental Europe it mutated into the principle of popular sover-
eignty, well-elaborated by the social contract philosophers Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau and Thomas Hobbes.16 According to popular sovereignty, the 
people are sovereign, not the ruler. By establishing a state, people either 
transfer their sovereignty to the ruler (Hobbes’s variation) or retain their 
sovereignty, giving the ruler only a mandate to exercise that supreme 
power on their behalf (Rousseau’s variation).17 On the other side of La 
Manche, however, Bodin’s principle mutated into the principle of par-
liamentary sovereignty. The parliament, as an institution, was seen as 
the ‘virtual approximation of the people and in that capacity entitled to 
supreme power’.18 
Although these three conceptions of sovereignty diverge on the ques-
tion of where in society this supreme power is located (in the ruler, the 
parliament, or the people), they all converge in the perception of sover-
eignty in indivisible and absolute terms. Indivisibility entails that sover-
eignty can only lie within one institution and that it cannot be shared or 
divided. Absoluteness, on the other hand, refers to ‘the scope of matters 
13  Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of Europe-
an Law (OUP 2009) 32.
14 Tina OršoliÊ Dalessio, ‘The Issue of Sovereignty in an Ever-Closer Union’  (2014) Croatian 
Yearbook of European Law & Policy 67, 69.
15 Although Bodin gave primarily a depiction of ‘monarchical sovereignty’, he claimed that 
his theory of sovereignty could also be applied to any other forms of regime. For a more 
detailed overview of his theory, see Richard Bourke and Quentin Skinner (eds), Popular 
Sovereignty in Historical Perspective (CUP 2016) 1-14, 115-142. Furthermore, certain schol-
ars have criticised his depiction of sovereignty for being more prescriptive than descriptive, 
serving rather the political purpose of strengthening the French monarchy in the time of 
wars of religion than giving a true picture of the distribution of power in France:  Oršoli  
Dalessio (n 14) 69.
16  OršoliÊ Dalessio (n 14) 70-71.
17  ibid.
18  Bourke (n 15) 8.
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over which a holder of authority is sovereign’.19 For an institution or a 
state to be absolutely sovereign, its authority must extend to all matters 
within the territory, unconditionally.20 
Relying on such understanding of sovereignty, George Jellinek, a 
German scholar from the late 19th century, in his ‘Die Lehre von den 
Staatenverbindungen’, presented the following conclusion regarding the 
locus of sovereignty in federal structures. Since sovereignty is absolute 
and indivisible, in any union only one level of government (federal or na-
tional) can be sovereign − a third possibility cannot exist.21 Sovereignty 
can reside either within the member states, in which case the union is a 
confederation, or it can reside within the union, in which case the union 
is a federal state.22 From this line of reasoning, the backbone of Eu-
ropean federal thought was created: a binary distinction between con-
federations and federations/federal states.23 Both George Jellinek’s and 
Johann Blunthschill’s24 19th century depictions of this binary distinction 
still play predominant roles in traditional federal theory today.25 
Before discussing the concepts of federations and confederations any 
further, it is important to stress that the term ‘confederation’ has fallen 
out of use. Today, scholars are keen to use only the (wider) term ‘inter-
national organisation’ to also describe legal entities that have confederal 
characteristics. For example, ASEAN, which, according to my analysis, 
is a textbook example of confederation, is predominantly referred to as 
‘a regional international organisation’. The reason probably lies in the 
fact that the term ‘confederation’ bears the stigma of weakness and in-
stability which derives from historical examples of confederations26 and 
19 Daniel Philpott, ‘Sovereignty’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2020) <https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/> accessed 26 July 2020.
20 ibid.
21 Nicholas Aroney, ‘The Infl uence of German State-Theory on the Design of the Australian 
Constitution’ (2010) 59 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 682-683.
22 Robert Schütze, European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, CUP 2016) 50.
23 It is important to stress that the concepts of confederation and federal state were not de-
veloped simultaneously. In the beginning, the traditional federal theory only differentiated 
between confederations and unitary states. It was only after the American federal theory 
came to life that the theory developed the concept of federal state as well. For a more de-
tailed evolution of these concepts,  see  Schütze (n 13) 15-40.
24 For more information on Johann Blunthschill’s federal theory, see Aroney (n 21) 675-681.
25 Johan Blunthschli’s understanding of confederations and federations partly differs from 
Jellinek’s understanding. Unlike Jellinek, who puts sovereignty at the forefront of the the-
ory, for Blunthschill sovereignty does not have a decisive role in distinguishing between 
federations and confederations. A key distinction lies in the nature and reach of federal 
organs of government.  For a more detailed overview of differences in their approach, see 
Aroney (n 21) 675-685.
26 Bruno de Witte ‘EU Law: Is It International Law?’ in Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers 
(eds), European Law (2nd edn, OUP 2017) 191.
67CYELP 16 [2020] 61-93
the fact that there was a sudden increase in the number of international 
organisations in the 20th century.27 However, for the sake of consistency, 
only the term ‘confederation’ will be used in this paper.
Confederations are seen as a purely international phenomenon. 
They are created on the basis of an ordinary international treaty28 be-
tween several sovereign states for the purpose of achieving a certain 
common goal.29 Since the basis of a confederation is an international 
treaty, the states retain their sovereignty, while the confederation itself 
does not become a state − it is a mere international union between sev-
eral sovereign states.30 
There are fi ve characteristics that the theory traditionally associ-
ates with confederations. Each one of these characteristics directly or 
indirectly refl ects the premise that states remain absolutely sovereign 
over their national territory. First, since an absolutely sovereign state 
cannot be bound unconditionally or permanently (because then it would 
lose part of its authority), the states in a confederation retain the right 
to nullifi cation and secession.31  Second, a confederal treaty establishes 
a shared institution which is comprised of an equal number of delegates 
from each state, representing their respective governments.32 Any dif-
ferent composition of a shared institution would either negate the fact 
that national governments remain sovereign over their territory (eg if the 
delegates were representing the citizens of the confederation) or the fact 
that each state is equally sovereign within the confederation (eg if one 
state could send more delegates than other states). Third, because oblig-
ing a state without its consent would negate its absolute authority, the 
shared institution adopts all its decisions on the basis of unanimity.  In 
cases where decisions are not adopted unanimously, those decisions are 
not binding on the member states which opposed their adoption. Fourth, 
in a confederation there is no legal relation between the shared institu-
tion and the citizens of each state − a relationship only exists between 
the shared institution and the governments of each state.33 Giving any 
27  Andrassy (n 1) 126.
28 The traditional federal theory of the 17th century distinguishes between temporary and 
permanent international treaties. Only the latter establishes a confederation by delegating 
powers of common interest to a ‘council’ comprised of representatives from each state. See 
Schütze (n 13) 18.
29 Andrassy (n 1) 126.
30  Schütze (n 22) 51.
31 ibid.
32 Pavlos  Eleftheriadis, ‘Federalism and Jurisdiction’ in Elke Cloots, Geert De Baere and 
Stefan Sottiaux (eds), Federalism in the European Union (Hart Publishing 2012) 46.
33 Ronald Watts, ‘Federalism, Federal Political System, and Federations’  (1998) Annual Re-
view of Political Science 121.
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executive powers to the shared institution directly would undermine the 
states’ authority to enforce laws on their citizens. Consequently, all the 
decisions of the shared institution oblige/create rights for citizens only if 
and when they are transposed into the national legal systems.34 All law 
enacted at a confederal level is nothing more than an international law. 
Finally, since the international law did not originally know of any other 
legal subjects beside states, the confederation is not considered to be a 
subject of that law.35 
Some prominent examples of confederations in the European le-
gal literature are the United Provinces of the Netherlands (from 1580 to 
1795), the Old Swiss Confederacy (from 1291 to 1798), and the American 
Confederation (from 1778 to 1787).36
While confederations are seen as purely international phenomena, 
the European federal theorists understand federations as a purely na-
tional phenomenon. Federations are created on the basis of a federal 
constitution.37 By enacting a federal constitution, the states lose all their 
sovereignty and are re-established as member states of that federation.38 
The federal level, however, becomes sovereign and the federation is per-
ceived as one state − the federal state.39 Such a ‘federal state’ is, in theo-
ry, as sovereign as a unitary state. 
The question that naturally arises from this line of reasoning is, 
if member states have lost all their sovereignty and the federal state is 
perceived to be sovereign as a unitary state, what is then the difference 
between member states in a federal state on the one hand, and admin-
istrative units in a unitary state on the other?40 According to Watts, the 
key difference is that in federal states there is ‘the constitutional guar-
antee of autonomy for the member states’ governments in responsibilities 
they perform’.41 In other words, on the basis of a federal constitution, 
member states’ governments retain certain powers which federal level 
cannot exercise. These powers are usually referred to as ‘exclusive legis-
lative powers’.42 However, the existence of such powers can be compatible 
with the idea of absolute sovereignty (on which this whole distinction 
34 Smerdel (n 1) 205.
35 Schütze (n 13) 32.
36  Andrassy (n 1) 126.
37 Smerdel (n 1) 204. 
38  Schütze (n 13) 33.
39 ibid.
40 ibid, 34.
41 Watts (n 33) 124.
42 Schütze (n 13) 33.
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between federations and confederations is based) only if the federal level, 
which is sovereign, is able to amend its federal constitution and change 
the scope of member states’ ‘exclusive’ powers. If the federal level did not 
have authority to do that, it would not really be absolutely sovereign. To 
stay true to its concept of sovereignty, the traditional federal theory in 
the end claims that ‘all powers are ultimately derived from the federal 
state’43 and that the federal level has the power to change its constitu-
tion and transform itself even into a unitary state (it possesses kompe-
tenz-kompetenz).44 
In line with the above, traditional federal characteristics do not dif-
fer much from those of a unitary state. These characteristics again, as is 
the case with the confederal characteristics presented above, directly or 
indirectly refl ect the concept of absolute sovereignty. First, since mem-
bers states have lost their sovereignty, there is no possibility for seces-
sion from the federal state.45 Second, a constitution establishes federal 
institutions, whose members directly represent the citizens of the fed-
eral state (who together make one polity).46 Third, decisions at a federal 
level are usually adopted by some form of majority voting, not by una-
nimity. While in a confederation unanimity serves to protect the abso-
lute sovereignty of every member state, in a federation such a need does 
not exist. Federal decisions can oblige the citizens of a certain member 
state even when all of their representatives in federal institutions have 
voted against. Fourth, federal institutions can, within the scope of the 
competences given to them by the federal constitution, directly regulate 
relations between the citizens and enforce enacted laws and other deci-
sions.47 Since federal institutions are the ones possessing absolute au-
thority, a direct link can exist between them and individuals.48 Finally, 
since the federation is perceived as a state, it is also a subject of interna-
tional law. It can conclude international agreements and represent itself 
in international relations.49 Some prominent examples of federal states 
include Indonesia, Myanmar and the Federal Republic of Germany.50 
This binary model of federalism, where all existing unions are either 




46 Aroney (n 21) 683.
47 Smerdel (n 1) 205 and Aroney (n 18) 679.
48  Eleftheriadis (n 32) 46.
49 Smerdel (n 1) 206.
50  Andrassy (n 1) 127.
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formal and democratic unitary constitutionalism.51 According to formal 
unitary constitutionalism, every legal system can have only one supreme 
source of law: a single constitution. That constitution can consist of mul-
tiple parts (for example: three different legal documents) but ‘these parts 
must all be put together into a single coherent legal whole’.52 Every single 
legal claim inside that legal system must be traceable back to that ‘co-
herent legal whole’.53
Democratic unitary constitutionalism, on the other hand, demands 
that ‘one people must form one State on the basis of one constitution’.54 
The concept is based on a theory of popular sovereignty according to 
which people are those that are really sovereign. Since they are sover-
eign, only they can (acting as one) create a constitution directly (through 
referenda) or indirectly (by electing a special assembly which then adopts 
the constitution on their behalf). By creating a constitution in such a 
manner, that people constitute one (sovereign) state.55 There can never 
be more peoples constituting one state.
In a unitary state, as the name already suggests, it is easy to envis-
age how these concepts function: there is one constitution created direct-
ly or indirectly by the people of that state. That constitution stands at the 
apex of the legal hierarchy and all the other laws must be in accordance 
with it. The more interesting question is whether the concepts of confed-
erations and federal states represent any challenge to these concepts of 
unitary constitutionalism. The short answer is − no, they do not.
In confederations, the states remain sovereign. Each state has its 
own legal system with a constitution at the top, which was created di-
rectly or indirectly by the people of that state alone. Since a confederation 
is regarded as a purely international phenomenon, all law enacted by the 
confederal institution is, in its essence, an international law. That inter-
national law is valid in the states’ legal systems under the conditions set 
out by both the international treaty which created the confederation, and 
the national constitutions. To be compatible with the concept of formal 
unitary constitutionalism, confederal law must always reside below the 
constitution in the legal hierarchy of the states.
51 ‘Constitutionalism is the set of ideas that defi nes what constitution is or ought to be’. 
 See Robert Schütze, ‘Constitutionalism and the European Union’  in Catherine Barnard and 
Steve Peers (eds), European Law (2nd edn, OUP 2017) 71.
52 Daniel Halberstam ‘“A People for Certain Purposes”: On the History and Philosophy of 
Federalism(s) in the United States and Europe’ (2018) 619 Michigan Public Law Research 
Paper 1, 3-4.
53 Halberstam (n 52) 8.
54 Schütze (n 51) 79.
55 ibid, 78.
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Unlike in confederations, in federations there is usually more than 
one constitution: the federal constitution and the constitutions of the 
member states. Although it may seem paradoxical, this situation does 
not pose a problem for the idea of unitary constitutionalism. This is 
because federations are understood as types of decentralised unitary 
states (where decentralisation is not performed by the national law, but 
by the federal constitution itself).56 Federation is created by federal dem-
os enacting the federal constitution, which then stands at the apex of 
the legal hierarchy. That federal constitution creates not only the federal 
government, but also member states’ governments, giving them a degree 
of autonomy from the central government. It enables each of the mem-
ber states to put their operating rules in a document which is called a 
constitution, but which is not a supreme source of law in the federal 
state.57 Those member states’ constitutions do not stand at the apex of 
the legal order and they must be in accordance with the supreme federal 
constitution. Their validity and existence depend entirely on the federal 
constitution.58 They are also not created by the people of the federation 
representing a single unit, but only by a part of that one people. Conse-
quently, these documents are constitutions only nominally, while only 
the federal constitution is the constitution per se in the sense of formal 
and democratic unitary constitutionalism. Daniel Halberstam calls this 
system ‘the system of nested constitution’ because ‘the federal constitu-
tion completely envelopes states’ constitutions’.59
In short, these are the central features of the traditional federal the-
ory and the theory of unitary constitutionalism. If we were to summarise 
these theories in one short claim, it could be phrased as following: since 
sovereignty is absolute and indivisible, it is always located at either the 
level of the member states, in which case we have a confederation, or at 
the federal level, in which case we have a federal state, and a formal/
democratic constitution always accompanies that locus of sovereignty.
3 ASEAN and the EU from the traditional federal standpoint
If we now try to observe the characteristics of ASEAN and the EU to 
conclude whether these legal entities are confederations or federal states, 
we are left with some mixed results. ASEAN fi ts easily into the confederal 
category, as if it were modelled after it. It can be used to explain every 
confederal characteristic mentioned in the previous section. It is the per-
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fect confederal child. On the other hand, the EU does not fi t well any-
where. It defi es both the confederal and federal category. It is a problem-
atic teenager that leaves us questioning whether this confederal-federal 
distinction is perhaps missing something? But let us start our analysis 
with the unproblematic one.
3.1 The perfect confederal child (ASEAN)
ASEAN represents a textbook example of a confederation. It has all 
the traditional confederal characteristics presented above. The cause be-
hind the purely confederal nature of ASEAN is the same that created 
the distinction between confederations and federations in the fi rst place: 
insistence on the concept of absolute and indivisible sovereignty. The 
aim of this section is to fi rstly provide a detailed picture of the Southeast 
Asian understanding of that concept of sovereignty and afterwards to 
show how member states, abiding by this concept, necessarily created a 
purely confederal structure of ASEAN. To do this, we need to travel back 
more than 400 years into the past.
The idea of absolute and indivisible sovereignty came to Southeast 
Asia in the 16th and the 17th century on board French, Dutch, British, 
Portuguese and Spanish ships, but it did not perish with the disap-
pearance of the colonists. Newly created states embraced the concept. 
When establishing ASEAN in 1967, the member states proclaimed that 
the fundamental principles of this new ‘international organisation’ are 
sovereignty and the sovereign equality of all the member states.60 They 
structured ASEAN’s institutions in a way that effectively ensures that 
‘sovereignty remains fi rmly located at the national level’.61 Sovereignty 
was understood in absolute terms, similarly to how Bodin understood 
it in the 16th century. Such understanding entailed that any transfer of 
the state’s authority to the supranational level was strictly prohibited. 
States must always retain full authority over their respective national 
territories.62
Although the European understanding of sovereignty has slightly 
changed over the years, moving away from this absolute concept to a 
more fl uid model,63 Southeast Asian understanding remains the same 
today. There are four main reasons why this is so. First, there is the colo-
60 Alan Collins, ‘Forming a Security Community: Lessons from ASEAN’ (2007) 7 Interna-
tional Relations of the Asia-Pacifi c 203, 212.
61 ibid. 
62  Shaun Narine, ‘State Sovereignty, Political Legitimacy and Regional Institutionalism in 
the Asia-Pacifi c’ (2004) 17 The Pacifi c Review 429.
63 OršoliÊ Dalessio (n 14) 72-76.
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nial experience of all ASEAN member states except Thailand. After years 
spent under foreign powers, member states’ governments are reluctant 
to give away any part of their newly acquired authority.64 Second, such 
understanding of sovereignty is compatible with the political regimes 
of certain member states. The political systems both of Brunei (an ab-
solute monarchy) and Thailand (a military dictatorship) are based on 
the idea of concentration of power, which is hardly compatible with any 
transfer of authority.65 Third, although there were certain military con-
fl icts between ASEAN member states before 1967, there has not been a 
type ‘of total war that Europe experienced over a number of centuries’.66 
Consequently, ‘the need to reduce the areas of national sovereignties as 
the price to be paid for future peace, has not been felt’.67 Finally, ASE-
AN member states are still preoccupied with the process of state build-
ing. To a certain degree, every government is still trying to establish 
domestic political legitimacy: ‘the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in 
its authority to issue commands, so that the commands are obeyed […] 
because they are believed to have moral authority […]’.68 The transfer of 
any authority is widely seen as being at least inconvenient for achieving 
this goal.69
Insistence on the described concept of the states’ sovereignty, from 
the beginning of integration until today, led to the creation of the two 
ever-present characteristics of ASEAN: the principle of non-intervention 
and the purely confederal structure of the shared institutions.
The former prohibits any violent or non-violent intervention of one 
member state in the internal affairs of another. Even commenting ver-
bally on any internal issue of another member state is perceived as a 
breach of that state’s sovereignty. One of the best recent examples of this 
principle in action is the predominant silence of ASEAN member states 
and ASEAN institutions in the wake of the potential genocide against the 
Rohingya Muslim community in 2018 in Myanmar.70
64  David Camroux, ‘The European Union and ASEAN: Two to Tango?’ (2008) Notre Europe 
1, 20.
65 Tomasso Visone, ‘The “ASEAN Way”: A Decolonial Path Beyond “Asian Values”’ (2017) 9 
Perspectives on Federalism 1, 7.
66  Camroux (n 64) 20.
67 ibid.
68 Narine (n 62) 427.
69 ibid, 444.
70 Angshuman Choudhury, ‘Why Are Myanmar’s Neighbours Ignoring the Rohingya Crisis?’ 
(The Diplomat, 25 September 2018) <https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/why-are-myan-
mars-neighbors-ignoring-the-rohingya-crisis/> accessed 22 December 2019.
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The second ever-present characteristic of ASEAN, its purely con-
federal structure, means that ASEAN has assumed all the traditional 
confederal characteristics under traditional federal theory which were 
presented in the previous section. The following paragraphs aim to prove 
this by examining ASEAN’s structure.
Firstly, as is always the case in confederations, the basis for the 
current institutional structure of ASEAN is a binding international legal 
agreement, ratifi ed by all member states in 2008: the ASEAN Charter.71
The ASEAN Charter prescribes not one but nine shared institutions 
of ASEAN.72 For ASEAN to be of a confederal structure, the decision-mak-
ing shared institutions must be composed of an equal number of del-
egates from each state, all representing their respective governments. 
This is exactly the case here. The ASEAN Summit which constitutes the 
‘supreme policy-making body’73 empowered to ‘deliberate, provide policy 
guidance and take decisions on key (ASEAN) issues’74 is composed of 
heads of states or governments who assemble twice a year for delibera-
tion.75 The ASEAN Summit can delegate some of its tasks to the ASEAN 
Coordinating Council which is composed of Foreign Ministers who again 
meet twice a year.76 Of other institutions not mentioned here, the only 
ones that are not composed of an equal number of government repre-
sentatives and are not accountable to the national governments are the 
Secretary General of ASEAN and the ASEAN Secretariat. However, these 
institutions primarily serve as administrative support for the organisa-
tion and consequently do not change the overall confederal composition 
of the ASEAN decision-making institutional structure.77 Although the 
Secretary General is formally given important tasks of monitoring the 
implementation of ASEAN agreements and decisions by member states, 
in reality he or she is unable to perform these duties due to the low 
fi nancial and human resources78 and the lack of any power to start a 
71 Atena Feraru ‘Four Years On: Testing Commitment to ASEAN Charter’ (2012) 1 <www.
researchgate.net/publication/326463901_Four_years_on_testing_commitment_to_ASE-
AN_Charter> accessed 22 December 2019. 
72 I will not describe each institution individually. However, for a complete overview of ASE-
AN’s legal structure, see Pattharapong  Rattanasevee, ‘Towards Institutionalized Region-
alism: The Role of Institutions and Prospects for Institutionalization in ASEAN’ (2014) 4 
<www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4182320/> accessed 22 December 2019.
73 Article 7(2a) of the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (2007) <www.
refworld.org/docid/4948c4842.html> accessed 24 December 2019.
74  Article 7(2b) of the ASEAN Charter 2007 (n 73). 
75 ibid.
76  Article 88 of the ASEAN Charter 2007 (n 73).
77 Rattanasevee (n 72) 4.
78  Feraru (n 71) 4.
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procedure against a state which would not transpose those documents 
into its national system.79
Regarding decision-making, in confederations decisions should be 
enacted unanimously. However, in ASEAN, decision-making is based on 
consultations and consensus.80 Asian scholars emphasise that consen-
sus does not necessary imply unanimity. While unanimity is reached 
when all actors explicitly agree on a certain proposal, consensus is also 
reached when the majority of actors support the proposal, and when 
those who have some misgivings about it do not feel so strongly about 
the issue to block (veto) action on it.81 Even if we understand consensus 
in that slightly different sense, this institute still does not undermine the 
states’ authority: any state can block an action that is contrary to its na-
tional interests. In other words, the confederal nature of decision-mak-
ing is well preserved. Nevertheless, there is one situation where ASEAN 
institutions can deviate from consensus-based decision-making, but, in 
my opinion, it does not pose a threat to the idea of the states’ absolute 
sovereignty, either. According to Article 20(2) of the ASEAN Charter, the 
ASEAN Summit has the discretion to determine how a specifi c decision 
will be made in the absence of consensus.82 However, the Summit’s deci-
sion again needs to be adopted by consensus. This gives the possibility to 
any member state to block non-consensus decision-making and protect 
its absolute sovereignty.
In ASEAN, there is also no legal relation between the shared insti-
tution and its decisions, on one hand, and the citizens of the member 
states, on the other. All ASEAN agreements and decisions have to be 
transposed into the national legal systems in accordance with the con-
stitutional structure of each member state. Only after that can they cre-
ate rights and obligations for individuals. Moreover, no effective sanction 
exists for member states which abstain from doing so. As already men-
tioned, the ASEAN secretariat, as an institution assigned with the task 
to monitor the implementation of the decisions of ASEAN institutions, 
lacks both the legal mechanisms and human and material resources to 
do so. Thus, it is of no surprise that one study in 2008 found that ‘during 
the preceding forty years only 30% of ASEAN agreements and initiatives 
were actually implemented’.83
79  Article 11(2) of the ASEAN Charter 2007 (n 73).
80  Article 20(1) of the ASEAN Charter 2007 (n 73). 
81 Feraru (n 71) 5.
82 Article 20(2) of the ASEAN Charter 2007 (n 73).
83 Rattanasevee (n 72) 6.
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There is, however, one characteristic of ASEAN which at fi rst glance 
deviates from traditional confederal characteristics. According to tradi-
tional federal theory, confederations cannot be the subjects of interna-
tional law. However, Article 3 of the Charter confers legal personality on 
ASEAN which is therefore considered a subject of international law.84 
ASEAN can enter into relations with other states and conclude interna-
tional agreements.85 What is even more problematic is that the ASEAN 
Secretary General, a function which departs from the traditional con-
federal structure, is in practice entrusted with the task of concluding 
them.86 There are, however, two reasons why I do not fi nd these devi-
ations from the confederal standard at all troublesome. First, the idea 
that confederations cannot be subjects of international law is based on 
outdated idea that only states should be considered as such. This idea 
was already abandoned in international legal theory with the exponen-
tial growth of the number of international organisations and should be 
abandoned in federal theory, as well.87 Second, the Secretary General 
does not have any power to signifi cantly oblige the member states by 
concluding international agreements. He or she, in practice, is only al-
lowed to conclude ‘non-sensitive’ agreements, such as the Memorandum 
of Understanding on Cultural Cooperation which was concluded with 
China in 2005.88 It is highly unlikely that the ASEAN Summit would en-
trust the Secretary General with the task of concluding anything more 
comprehensive, such as Free Trade Agreements. 
Regardless of this last apparent deviation, it is safe to claim that the 
legal structure of ASEAN is of a purely confederal nature. This conclu-
sion is further reinforced by observing ASEAN under the concept of for-
mal unitary constitutionalism. As is the case with confederations under 
this concept, each ASEAN member state has its own distinct legal sys-
tem with some form of formal constitution at the top, while law enacted 
by ASEAN institutions is valid in those systems only if member states 
decide to transpose it.89 All in all, ASEAN is indeed a perfect confederal 
child.
84 Article 3 of the ASEAN Charter 2007 (n 73). 
85 Daniel Seah ‘The ASEAN Charter’ (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quar-
terly 197, 203.
86 ibid, 9.
87 Andrassy (n 1) 77.
88 Seah (n 85) 9.
89 I will refrain from analysing ASEAN in the light of democratic unitary constitutionalism 
since some member states do not even have democratic institutions. 
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3.2 The problematic teenager (the EU) 
While fi nding ASEAN’s place in the binary distinction between feder-
ations and confederations is an easy task, doing the same with the EU is 
nothing of the sort. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the le-
gal nature of the EU is the subject of a long and complex debate. Numerous 
papers written on the topic have not produced a single solution regarding 
how the EU should be conceptualised. This section aims to present why is 
it hard to fi nd the EU’s place in the federal-confederal dichotomy. As in the 
previous section, this will be done by analysing whether the EU has con-
federal or federal characteristics and by identifying the locus of the formal 
constitution. However, unlike in the case of ASEAN, such an analysis will 
leave us with far more questions than answers. 
At fi rst glance, some EU characteristics point to the conclusion that 
the EU is a confederation. The EU is not based on a federal constitution, 
but on a mere international agreement between several sovereign states: 
at the moment, the Lisbon treaty.90 Since it is created on the basis of 
an international agreement, the EU is not a sovereign state but a mere 
institutional relation between several sovereign Member States that re-
tain full authority over their respective territories.91 This claim is further 
supported by the fact that the Member States can, as seen in the case 
of Brexit,92 leave the EU at any time they want.93 Leaving the EU would 
be absolutely prohibited if it were a sovereign federal state. So far, so 
confederal.
However, if we look deeper into the characteristics of this treaty-cre-
ated system, the purely traditional confederal characteristics seem to 
fade away and some kind of mixture between confederal and federal 
characteristics emerges. 
The internal composition of decision-making institutions is neither 
completely federal nor confederal. On the one hand, there are institu-
tions such as the European Council and the Council of Ministers, com-
posed of head of states or governments and acting national ministers, 
respectively, which are more of a confederal nature.94 On the other hand, 
there is the European Parliament and the European Commission which 
are more of a federal nature. The European Parliament is composed of 
90  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union  [2008] OJ C115/13; Consolidate 
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  [2008] OJ C326/13.
91 Schütze (n 13) 32.
92 For more on Brexit, see Steve Peers and Darren Harvey, ‘Brexit: The Legal Dimension’  in 
Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds), European Law (2nd edn, OUP 2017) 815.
93 Article 50 of Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13.
94 Schütze (n 22) 169, 173, 174.
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representatives directly elected by the European citizens, in a similar 
way to how national parliamentary representatives in unitary states are 
elected by national citizens.95 The European Commission, although ap-
pointed in a process in which both the national governments and the 
European Council have a signifi cant role, is not accountable to those in-
stitutions but to the European Parliament, and through the parliament, 
indirectly, to the European citizens themselves.96 However, not only is 
it that this institutional structure as a whole is of a dual nature, but 
in every individual shared institution there is also a certain mixture of 
federal and confederal elements. For example, the principle of ‘degressive 
proportionality’ in the distribution of seats in the European Parliament 
adds a confederal element to its structure,97 while the system of ‘double 
majority’ adds a federal element to the structure of the Council.98
 Decision-making has, at least formally, moved away from the con-
federal principle of unanimity. The treaties prescribe that most of the 
legislative acts are to be adopted in the so-called ‘ordinary legislative pro-
cedure’, consisting of majority voting in both the European Parliament 
and the Council.99 Unanimity is only retained in some ‘special legislative 
procedures’ to ensure the protection of national interests in sensitive 
policy areas.100 For example, measures concerning social security and 
social protection, or measures regarding family law with cross-border 
implications, are enacted in a special legislative procedure in which the 
Council must adopt the legislative act by unanimous vote.101
However, in practice, consensual decision-making in the Council is 
still predominantly the norm regardless of the formal rules stipulating 
majority voting.102 Between 1994 and 2006, around 80% of all Council 
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100 ibid, 123.
101 ibid.
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don School of Economics and Political Science, 11 June 2013) <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
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not reached by consensus, usually not more than one country abstained 
from voting or voted against the proposal.104 There are cases where mul-
tiple countries explicitly voted against a certain decision, but these are 
extremely rare. One of the more prominent examples is the decision on 
the relocation of refugees enacted in 2015, with Hungary, Czechia, Ro-
mania, and Slovakia voting against.105 The subsequent total non-imple-
mentation of this decision by the Hungarian, Polish and Slovakian gov-
ernments surely brings into question the effi ciency of a decision enacted 
by majority voting.106
All in all, it can be concluded that decision-making is formally of a 
mixed confederal-federal nature, while in practice it still leans towards 
the confederal pole.
The legal relation between shared institutions and citizens of the 
Member States is also of a mixed nature. The two main forms of EU 
legislative acts are regulations and directives.107 Regulations are of a fed-
eral character because they are directly applicable in all Member States: 
they directly regulate relations between individuals. Member States do 
not and must not transpose regulations, and individuals can (in princi-
ple) rely on them before national institutions.108  Directives, on the other 
hand, are of a confederal character: they are not addressed to individu-
als, but to the Member States which are required to transpose them into 
their national legal systems.109 However, the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union (hereinafter: the CJEU) did alter their confederal nature by 
proclaiming in Van Duyn and subsequent case law that a directive can 
have a direct effect under certain conditions.110
Regarding the enforcement of the above-mentioned EU acts, the EU 
institutions do not have their own institution for this purpose. Conse-
quently, they rely on the national institutions of the Member States with 
the help of principles of supremacy, pre-emption and direct effect.111  How-
ever, in the case where national institutions fail or refuse to enforce EU 
104 Heidenberg (n 102) 73.
105 Frank Heber, ‘The Council of the EU: How Consensus Is(n’t) Reached’ (The New Feder-
alist, 30 August 2020).
106 One could argue that this decision was successfully enacted since the Commission later 
won an infringement procedure against the countries that did not implement it. However, 
that judgment, issued fi ve years after the decision was enacted, brings little comfort to ei-
ther the Member States of the fi rst entry or to the migrants residing on their territory.
107 Bradley (n 99) 99.
108 ibid.
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110  Michael Bobek, ‘The Effects of EU Law in the National Legal Systems’ in Catherine Bar-
nard and Steve Peers (eds), European Law (2nd edn, OUP 2017) 143, 153. 
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law the only way for the EU to enforce that law is to initiate an infringe-
ment procedure against the Member State in which the institutions did 
not comply.112 Consequently, the system of enforcement also seems to lie 
somewhere between traditional federal and confederal characteristics.
As though trying to conclude whether the EU constitutes a feder-
ation or a confederation on the basis of this federal-confederal mixture 
is not challenging enough, let us try to do the same by locating the for-
mal constitution. According to formal unitary constitutionalism, the su-
preme source of law or the formal constitution must be located either at 
the level of the EU or at the level of the Member States. If it is located at 
the EU level (within the founding treaties), the EU is a federal state; if it 
is located at the Member State level (within 27 national constitutions), it 
is a confederation. However, when we pose the question whether the for-
mer or the latter is the case here, we are left with contradictory answers 
depending on who we ask.
On the one hand, there is the standpoint of the CJEU. In some of its 
earliest judgments, Costa v ENEL and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, 
the CJEU proclaimed the principle of the absolute supremacy of EU law 
over national law.113 According to the CJEU, EU law in its entirety must 
prevail over the whole of national law, including the constitutional law 
of the Member States.114 Any other relation between national and EU 
law could lead to various applications of EU law from one Member State 
to another which would jeopardise the attainment of the Treaty objec-
tives and give rise to discrimination between EU citizens.115 In the words 
of formal unitary constitutionalism, this view means that the supreme 
source of law is located at the EU level (more precisely within the Lisbon 
treaty) and that the Member States’ constitutions are only nominal con-
stitutions which have to be in accordance with the higher EU norms.116
112 ibid, 62.
113 Schütze (n 51) 74.
114 ibid.
115 Case 6/64 Costa ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.
116 Regarding the question from where exactly the treaties draw this supreme authority (the 
governments of Member States, one EU people or multiple peoples of Europe), the CJEU 
did not provide a clear answer. In its early Van Gend en Loos judgment, the CJEU stated 
that the treaties created the new legal order of international law (hinting that the authority 
comes from the Member States) but in later judgments the word ‘international’ was thrown 
out and the CJEU continued to talk only about the new legal order (without elaborating 
whether it is national, international or something in between). Moreover, in Van Gend en 
Loos, the CJEU also stated that the Treaties are more than just an arrangement that cre-
ates mutual obligations between Member States and that this is supported by the fact that 
the preamble of the Treaties refers not only to the governments but also to the peoples of 
Europe. There the CJEU hinted that the source of authority is neither governments nor the 
one people of Europe, but rather both the multiple peoples of Europe and the governments: 
a concept that cannot be understood under the democratic unitary constitutional theory.
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Unsurprisingly, national constitutional courts do not share the 
standpoint of the CJEU. They only accept the relative supremacy of EU 
law. This means that EU law prevails over some national law, but not 
over national constitutions.117 National constitutions remain the su-
preme source of law in the sense of formal unitary constitutionalism. 
This standpoint is well elaborated in the Maastricht and Lisbon judg-
ments of the German Federal Constitutional Court (hereinafter: the 
BVerfG), one of more infl uential national constitutional courts in the EU. 
The BVerfG reasoning there relies heavily on democratic unitary consti-
tutional theory. In a nutshell, the BVerfG claims that the German consti-
tution remains the supreme source of law until German citizens together 
with other EU citizens democratically create a federal EU constitution. 
In other words, in order for a formal constitution to be established at 
the EU level, and consequently for the absolute supremacy of EU law to 
be achieved, the preconditions of democratic unitary constitutionalism 
fi rst need to be fulfi lled. According to the BVerfG, this has not yet hap-
pened.118
Therefore, the question of supremacy, and with it the location of the 
formal constitution in the EU, remains contested. Neither the CJEU on 
the one hand nor the national constitutional courts led by the BVerfG 
on the other are willing to withdraw from their standpoints. Since the 
CJEU’s fi rst judgment on absolute supremacy, these two sides have been 
waging some form of cold war on this issue. During this confl ict, two 
specifi c legal questions have been raised: fundamental rights and ultra 
vires control.
First in line were fundamental rights. Answering a preliminary 
question raised by the German national court in Internationale Handels-
gesellschaft judgment, the CJEU, in line with its absolute supremacy 
standpoint, claimed that EU law trumps fundamental rights contained 
in the national constitution. When the same case came before the BVerfG, 
the German court disagreed. In its famous Solange I judgment, the BVer-
fG established its relative supremacy theory and by relying on that the-
ory proclaimed that for as long as the European legal order does not de-
velop an adequate standard of fundamental rights protection, the BVerfG 
will ‘disapply EU law confl icting with fundamental rights guaranteed by 
the German constitution’.119 However, this has never happened, since the 
CJEU subsequently developed a signifi cant level of protection in the form 
117 Schütze (n 51) 74.
118 Daniel Thym, ‘In the Name of Sovereign Statehood: A Critical Introduction to the Lisbon 
Judgment of the German Constitutional Court’ (2009) Common Market Law Review 1797-
1802.
119  Schütze (n 22) 129.
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of general principles of law.120 This led to the second judgment of BVerfG, 
Solange II, in which the court reversed its standpoint: the BVerfG now 
claimed that for as long as there is an effective protection of fundamental 
rights at the EU level similar to the level of protection under the Ger-
man constitution, the BVerfG will not exercise its jurisdiction to decide 
whether EU law is in accordance with constitutional fundamental rights 
guarantees.121 In this way, the BVerfG reaffi rmed its relative supremacy 
standpoint but withdrew from going further into open confl ict with the 
CJEU. There was no need to start an armed battle with the CJEU (by 
striking down EU legislation), since the BVerfG effectively got what it 
wanted (a higher protection of fundamental rights at the EU level). How-
ever, the question of supremacy was left hanging in the air.
The confl ict resurfaced years later with the adoption of the Maastricht 
Treaty which signifi cantly extended the scope of EU competences.122 This 
time, it revolved around the question of which court, the CJEU or the 
national constitutional court, has the fi nal word in determining whether 
a certain EU act goes beyond the scope of conferred competences. In line 
with its absolute supremacy doctrine, the CJEU claimed that its decision 
must be fi nal. Not only is the CJEU alone competent to rule on the va-
lidity of EU acts, but giving national (constitutional) courts such a possi-
bility could also lead to divergence between courts of the Member States 
which would jeopardise the unity of the EU legal order.123 The CJEU’s 
interpretation of the scope of EU competences must reign supreme. The 
BVerfG again disagreed. In its Maastricht judgment and Honeywell deci-
sion, the BVerfG established its ultra vires review doctrine.124 Since the 
German constitution, in line with the relative supremacy doctrine, was 
still the supreme source of law, the BVerfG must have the power to evalu-
ate whether an EU act remains within the limit of conferred competence. 
If the BVerfG were not able to do that, the German constitution would not 
really be supreme and the CJEU would possess kompetenz-kompetenz: 
the power to unilaterally extend the EU’s competences.125
120 For a more detail overview on how fundamental rights came to be protected as a general 
principle of law in the jurisprudence of the CJEU, see Eleanor Spaventa, ‘Fundamental 
Rights in the European Union’ in Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds), European Law 
(2nd edn, OUP 2017) 227.
121 Schütze (n 22) 130-131.
122 For a detail overview of the Maastricht Treaty, see Paul Craig, ‘Development of the EU’ 
in Catherine Barnard and Steve Peers (eds), European Law (2nd edn, OUP 2017) 20-22. 
123  Court of Justice of the EU, ‘Press release following the judgment of the German Consti-
tutional Court of 5 May 2020’ (2020).
124 For a detailed overview of the Maastricht judgment, see Kevin Makowski, ‘Solange III: 
The German Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision on Accession to the Maastricht Treaty 
on European Union’ (2014) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 155.
125 Daniel Sarmiento, ‘Requiem for Judicial Dialogue: The German Federal Constitutional 
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83CYELP 16 [2020] 61-93
This time the dispute did not end with both sides just proclaiming 
their opposite views, as was the case with fundamental rights. Most re-
cently, on 5 May 2020, the BVerfG fi red its fi rst shots toward the CJEU. 
In its Weiss judgment, the BVerfG declared both the decision by the Eu-
ropean Central Bank and the judgment of the CJEU on whether that de-
cision is within the scope of EU competences ultra vires.126 The CJEU was 
fast to fi re back by issuing a press release in which, although it did not 
comment on the BVerfG’s judgment directly, it did reaffi rm its position on 
the absolute supremacy of EU law.127 Moreover, it seems that the CJEU 
also received support from a powerful ally: the European Commission. 
Ursula von der Leyen stated that the Commission would analyse the 
German court’s ruling and look into possible steps to take, which could 
include the option of infringement proceedings.128 Time will tell how this 
confl ict will be resolved. It will probably either be watered down through 
judicial dialogue and the gradual elimination of confl icting questions, or 
further infl amed by other ultra vires declarations from both sides.
 This whole supremacy saga represents clear peril for the concept of 
unitary constitutionalism. The existence of two confl icting supremacy 
claims within the single EU legal system is incompatible with its core 
notion of ‘unitarity’. Unitary constitutionalism requires a hierarchical 
structure with a single supreme point. However, the EU legal system has 
functioned for the last 60 years without giving a fi nal answer to the locus 
of that supreme point and, judging by the recent development, neither 
side is willing to back down on its claims any time soon. The parallel 
existence of two supreme points is not something unitary constitutional-
ism can explain. The only way to give an answer to whether the EU con-
stitutes a federation or a confederation under this concept would require 
either siding with the CJEU or with the BVerfG and putting the idea of 
the simultaneous existence of two supreme points out of the question.
So, what should we conclude from the above presented mix of con-
federal and federal characteristics and lack of consensus on the locus 
of the formal constitution? Is the EU a federal state or a confederation? 
How can it be a confederation if it has federal characteristics which are 
not compatible with the principle of absolute and indivisible sovereignty? 
126 However, this is not the fi rst time that a national supreme or constitutional court within 
the EU has proclaimed that a decision of the CJEU is ultra vires. The same was done by the 
Czech Constitutional court in the Landtova judgment and by the Danish Supreme Court in 
the Ajos judgment. See Sarmiento (n 125) 13, 14.
127 Court of Justice of the EU (n 123).
128  Joana Gill, ‘Von der Leyen: “The Final Word on EU Law Is Always Spoken in Luxem-
bourg”’ (euronews, 1 May 2020) <https://www.euronews.com/2020/05/08/eu-s-top-
court-fi res-back-over-german-ecb-ruling-as-primacy-of-eu-law-comes-into-play> accessed 
28 July 2020.
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How can it be a federal state if it is based on an international agreement 
and does not have a common constitution? Is it, then, something else, 
something in between? If so, what? As already mentioned, European 
scholars have not provided a single answer to these questions. While 
some try to stay true to the European federal theory by shoving the EU 
into our well-known confederal-federal dichotomy, others point out that 
the EU is something entirely new: a sui generis entity which cannot be 
defi ned as either confederation or federation.
Those scholars who remain faithful to the traditional federal theory 
claim that the EU is a confederation.129 For them, the EU cannot be a fed-
eral state because it is still based on an ordinary international treaty be-
tween several sovereign states. For as long as the people of Europe do not 
adopt a federal constitution in accordance with the principles of demo-
cratic constitutionalism, the EU will remain only an international union 
of 27 sovereign Member States.130 Each Member State has its own legal 
system with a formal constitution at the top. EU law is nothing but an in-
ternational law that forms part of those systems in accordance with the 
regime set out in the founding treaties and national constitutions. This 
view, unsurprisingly, dismisses from the start the claim of the CJEU 
about the absolute supremacy of EU law. EU law can only be relatively 
supreme: it cannot stand above the national constitutions which are still 
the supreme source of law in the Member States. It can become absolute-
ly supreme once the EU turns into a federal state, but the predispositions 
for the EU to develop into one have just not happened yet.
However, claiming that the EU is a confederation necessarily im-
plies that the EU then has all the elements which European federal the-
ory prescribes for confederations. Firstly, that absolute and indivisible 
sovereignty is located at the level of the Member States. Secondly, that 
the structure of the EU has traditional confederal characteristics. The 
problem is that in the EU neither of these elements exists. Therefore, the 
advocates of the idea that the EU is a confederation had to adjust the 
traditional federal theory to fi t this new legal reality. They started from 
the question of sovereignty.
If absolute sovereignty resided at the national level, that would im-
ply that the Member States have absolute authority over their territory. 
However, in the EU this is not the case. EU institutions can enact bind-
129 This group consists of numerous constitutional court judges and international law pro-
fessors. Some of the legal scholars advocating that the EU is still a confederation are Pavlos 
Eleftheriadis (who agrees that the EU is not a federal state and disregards the idea of a pos-
sible pluralist legal system. See Eleftheriadis (n 32) 45) and Paul Reuter (who claims that 
EU law is a part of public international law. See Ziller (n 5) 5.
130  Schütze (n 51) 78.
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ing rules that are directly applicable in the national systems regardless 
of whether a certain number of Member States oppose them (for example 
when a Member State is outvoted in the Council during the ordinary 
legislative procedure concerning a certain regulation). Absolute and indi-
visible sovereignty is ‘entirely absent from the political and legal setting 
of the European Union’.131
Since the old concept of sovereignty is non-existent in the EU, schol-
ars had to redefi ne it. The understanding of sovereignty, which was pre-
sented in the analysis of ASEAN earlier, that any decision of a confed-
eration which is enacted without the consent of one member state is in 
a breach of that member state’s sovereignty, had to be abandoned. The 
principle had to be arranged in a way that the exercise of state-like pow-
ers by the EU, even against the will of a Member State, does not consti-
tute a breach of the states’ sovereignty. 
The need to redefi ne the concept of sovereignty was especially ur-
gent in European judicial practice. With Treaty amendments rapidly ex-
panding the scope of EU competences at the end of the 20th century, 
questions were being raised in front of constitutional courts regarding 
the compatibility of such transfers of competences with national consti-
tutions and the principle of sovereignty inscribed in them. Insistence on 
absolute sovereignty of the state in answering those question would have 
rendered the whole EU integration unconstitutional.132
Therefore, a new concept of sovereignty was born: non-absolute sover-
eignty. Sovereignty still remains located at the national level until the EU 
becomes a federal state, but the transfer of some ‘sovereign power’ (state-
like power) to the EU level is not incompatible with the principle.133 As long 
as the transfer is voluntary and revocable, the Member States can engage 
in the far-reaching transfer of sovereign powers to the EU without losing 
their sovereignty.134 As the Czech constitutional court explains: 
131 OršoliÊ Dalessio (n 14) 73.
132 The compatibility of the transfer of competence to the EU with a national constitution 
was a subject of the Crotty v An Taoiseach judgment by the Irish Supreme Court, the Maas-
tricht I judgment by the French Constitutional Court and many other judgments. For a more 
detail overview of all the relevant judgments, see Oršoli  Dalessio (n 14) 76-80.
133 de Witte (n 26) 182.
134 As MacCormick wrote when discussing the Factortame judgment of the CJEU, ‘the Eu-
ropean Community situation is one in which (the UK) Parliament has delegated power to 
the Community’s law-making organs, hence the commands they (the EU institutions) issue 
are binding on UK citizens in virtue of their pre-adoption by the sovereign body. […] [This] 
does not weaken the view that Parliament remains a sovereign whose commands are the 
ultimate source of law, since this is what Parliament has commanded − that all subsequent 
commands be read as calling for obedience only so far as is compatible with (continuingly 
commanded) Community rights and obligations’. See Neil MacCormick ‘Beyond the Sover-
eign State’ (1993) 56 The Modern Law Review 1.
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a transfer of state competences at the EU level does not represent a con-
ceptual weakening of state sovereignty. […] [I]t can lead to its strength-
ening, so long as such a transfer of powers is based on the sovereign’s 
free will and is conditioned by the sovereign’s participation in the inte-
gration in a manner previously agreed upon and that is reviewable.135 
When we shift our understanding of sovereignty in that direction, it 
is easy to justify why the EU’s legal structure does not have traditional 
confederal characteristics. Whether confederations have more federal or 
more confederal traditional characteristics does not even matter any-
more. The fl exibility of the new understanding of sovereignty allows the 
Member States to create a confederation with whichever legal structure 
they see fi t. As long as there is no constitutional moment where sover-
eignty is transferred to the union, that legal entity is to remain the con-
federation.
Thus, a commonly used dichotomy for distinguishing between ASE-
AN and the EU emerges − the difference between two types of confeder-
ations. On the one hand, we have more confederal confederations which 
are defi ned as ‘intergovernmental organisations’, and, on the other hand, 
we have more federal confederations which are called ‘supranational or-
ganisations’.136 According to these scholars, the EU is an excellent exam-
ple of the later.137
However, the second group of scholars does not share the same view 
on the legal nature of the EU.138 They agree that the EU is not yet a fed-
eral state, but they also claim that it is not a confederation anymore. The 
characteristics of EU law (such as the broad nature of EU competenc-
es, common citizenship, the already-mentioned decision-making regime, 
etc) are so far from the general characteristics of confederations that 
calling the EU that way would be like trying ‘to push the toothpaste back 
135  OršoliÊ Dalessio (n 14) 79.
136 Numerous papers comparing ASEAN and the EU state that the EU, as opposed to ASE-
AN which is an intergovernmental international organisation, is more of a supranational 
entity. For example, David Camroux states that ‘[…] ASEAN remains basically only an inter-
governmental organisation while the European Union is also, on another level, a suprana-
tional entity’ (Camroux (n 64) 7). Yeo Lay Hwee, Director of the European Union Centre in 
Singapore, states that the EU is a ‘far more legalistic entity with supranational institutions’ 
while ASEAN is ‘a more consensus-driven collaborative enterprise’ (Yeo Lay Hwee, ‘ASEAN’s 
Cooperation with the European Union − ASEM and Beyond’ (2017) Panorama ASEAN at 50: 
A Look at External Relations 81, 84).  
137  de Witte (n 26) 180.
138 Some scholars who claim that the EU is not a confederation anymore are Robert Shü-
tze (who claims that it is a federal union, as understood in the light of American federal 
tradition), Daniel Halberstam (who considers that we should move from sovereignty talk to 
understanding the EU (n 52)) and the current president of the CJEU, Koen Lenaerts.
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in the tube’.139 The EU lies ‘somewhere in between these (confederal and 
federal) poles’.140
Because there is no entity in the world that even closely resembles 
the EU and there is no realistic prospect for there to be one anytime 
soon, some scholars from this second group decided to proclaim that the 
EU is a sui generis legal phenomenon.141 Sui generis literally means ‘of its 
own kind’.142 The EU is unique and cannot be defi ned by references to 
either confederations or federal states, although it has characteristics of 
both of these categories. It is a class by itself. In this way, they have sin-
gled out the EU from all of the federations and confederations that have 
ever existed and ever will.
4  Conclusion
If we put the sui generis theory aside for now, what can we conclude 
about the legal nature of the EU and ASEAN from the analysis presented 
above? 
It is noticeable that ASEAN has purely confederal characteristics 
while the EU has some kind of mix of confederal and federal ones. These 
characteristics refl ect the distribution of authority between the national 
and confederal level in those two entities. ASEAN has confederal char-
acteristics because it is structured in a way which ensures that member 
states retain absolute authority over their territories without any inter-
ference from the confederal level. The EU has mixed characteristics be-
cause it is constructed in a way which allows the authority to either be 
shared (eg the ordinary legislative procedure) or divided (eg the infringe-
ment procedure or special legislative procedures) between the national 
and EU level. In other words, these characteristics display how different-
ly these two entities function. They are also the cause of labelling ASEAN 
as an ‘intergovernmental’ and the EU as a ‘supranational’ organisation. 
Because of these characteristics, one could easily argue that ASEAN and 
the EU are of a completely different legal nature.
However, confederal and federal characteristics seem to be of sec-
ondary importance, if not completely unimportant, to the traditional fed-
eral theory. The primary focus of the theory is on the locus of sovereignty 
and the binary distinction that comes with it. Legal entities in which 
sovereignty is located at the national level are considered confederations, 
139 de Witte (n 26) 185, 186.
140 ibid, 178.
141 Schütze (n 22) 63.
142 Legal Information Institute <www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sui_generis> accessed on 22 De-
cember 2019.
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while those in which sovereignty is located at the union level are consid-
ered federations, regardless of whether they have more federal or confed-
eral characteristics. Consequently, according to the theory, both ASEAN 
and the EU are just two slightly different confederations. The differences, 
such as on one hand that the EU institutions can enact laws regardless 
of the will of the national governments, which are then directly binding 
on EU citizens, and on the other hand that ASEAN institutions can only 
enact laws with the consent of all governments, which are only binding 
on national citizens if these governments decide to transpose them, do 
not matter at all.
The key to understanding why the traditional federal theory over-
looks the characteristics of the legal structure lies in its above-presented 
historical evolution. The theory was always based on the concept of sov-
ereignty. When sovereignty was only conceived in absolute and indivisible 
terms, everything functioned perfectly. As seen in the analysis of ASE-
AN, in a union based on absolute sovereignty the theory can presuppose 
and explain both the characteristics of the union’s legal structure and 
the hierarchy of law. However, in Europe the idea of absolute sovereignty 
was cast aside after the Second World War. Already in the early days of 
European integration the Member States limited their absolute authority 
by transferring their power to regulate coal and steel production to the 
High Authority. The traditional federal theory had to be adapted to fi t this 
new reality. This was done simply by replacing the old understanding of 
sovereignty for a new, non-absolute one. However, instead of creating a 
new classifi cation based on this new understanding of sovereignty, the 
binary confederal−federal dichotomy that was based on the old concept 
of absolute sovereignty was retained. This resulted in both the federal 
and confederal box being stripped of any associated characteristics. The 
new non-absolute understanding of sovereignty ‘allowed’ for the existence 
of confederations with purely federal characteristics, and vice versa. The 
nature of the legal structure was pushed aside completely.
This brings us back to the question posed at the beginning of this 
paper: is this federal theory, which emphasises the locus of sovereign-
ty and disregards the characteristics of the legal structure, really the 
best way to explain and categorise the EU, ASEAN, or any other existing 
union of states? There are four main reasons why I believe it is not.
First, the basis of the theory, the principle of sovereignty, is very am-
biguous. Although both scholars and legal practitioners agree that sover-
eignty can no longer be conceived in absolute terms, there is a consider-
able number of different interpretations on how it should be perceived.143 
143 For a detailed overview of this debate, see Neil Walker, ‘Late Sovereignty in the European 
Union’ in Neil Walker (ed), Sovereignty in Transition (1st edn, Hart Publishing 2003) 3.
89CYELP 16 [2020] 61-93
These discrepancies in interpretation raise the question of whether we 
should ground our whole understanding of federalism on such a princi-
ple, or if we should rather come up with a different basis.144 As OršoliÊ 
Dalessio explains vividly: ‘The principle of sovereignty […] remains a 
phantom chameleon straddling the territories of legal doctrine and con-
stitutional practice. While this does not per se render it dangerous, it 
does put into question the role, strength and credibility of this curious 
creature’.145
Second, insistence on the binary confederal−federal dichotomy is 
illogical from today’s perspective. This binary distinction was almost en-
tirely built on the basis of one component of the old understanding of 
sovereignty: its absoluteness.146 This idea that absolute authority could 
only be located either within the member states or within the union is 
what gave this distinction both meaning and content (confederal and 
federal characteristics). Since this element of absoluteness was removed 
from the equation due to the fact that it did not correspond to reality, 
we should not stick with the distinction it created. If the traditional fed-
eral theory still needs to be based on the principle of sovereignty, there 
should at least be a new non-binary classifi cation that corresponds to 
the fact that authority can be shared in various ways between the na-
tional and union level.
Third, because of its preoccupation with the locus of sovereignty, 
the theory completely neglects the similarities between the legal struc-
tures of certain unions. For example, if member states, by concluding an 
international agreement, create a union with predominantly traditional 
federal characteristics, such a union would still be considered a confed-
eration under this theory. The same is true in the opposite direction: if 
the federal constitution creates a union with mostly confederal elements, 
such a union would still be considered a federal state. It does not matter 
to the theory that these unions would have more in common with those 
in which the question of the locus of sovereignty is answered differently. 
As long as sovereignty is not located at the same level, such unions are 
incomparable.
144 One could argue that other principles of liberal constitutionalism, such as the rule of 
law or equality, are also vague and indetermined but that they nevertheless form the basis 
of liberal democracies. However, in my opinion, there is a big difference between them and 
the principle of sovereignty. In the case of the principle of sovereignty, there are numerous 
contrasting views regarding the core content of that principle, while in the case of a princi-
ple such as the rule of law disagreements mostly revolve around the question of its scope 
while the core content is uncontested.
145 OršoliÊ Dalessio (n 14) 87.
146 The other component on the basis of which the distinction was created is the indivisibil-
ity of sovereignty. However, absoluteness played the predominant role in shaping both the 
confederal and the federal box.
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Finally, unitary constitutional theory (which is the only compatible 
constitutional theory with this notion of federalism) fails to explain the 
existence of two contradictory claims regarding the locus of the formal 
constitution within one union. As seen in the analysis of the EU, the 
theory only functions if it sides with one of the two existing supremacy 
claims. Consequently, the theory is more prescriptive than descriptive: 
it shows how the EU should function, not how it really does. However, 
the existence of two contradictory supremacy claims is not unique to the 
EU. According to Schütze, the notion of unitarity has ‘never lived up to 
the constitutional practice of federal orders’.147 In many federal unions, 
both the union and the member states can have their own constitutional 
claims which may come into confl ict. There is a theory to explain such 
situations called ‘constitutional pluralism’. It centres on the premise that 
in a union of states there can exist multiple constitutional orders which 
interact in a heterarchical way.148 However, such a theory is incompatible 
with the European federal theory because of the very different under-
standing of the notion of sovereignty.149
In my opinion the presented arguments show that every aspect of 
the traditional federal theory, including its base, the confederal-federal 
dichotomy, and understanding of the legal structure and constitutional-
ism, is in some form of crisis. The underlying cause of all these crises is 
that the theory, which was fi rst created on the fi ction that sovereignty 
must always remain absolute, failed to adequately adapt to the reality 
that unions with shared or divided authority exist. Therefore, there is an 
urgent need to readapt it to better suit this legal reality, but how exactly 
should we do that?
First, this should not be done by opting for the presented sui generis 
theory. There are multiple problems with this theory, the most signifi -
cant being that it is not a theory at all: it just singles out the EU as some-
thing special without creating any standard under which similar entities 
should be measured. Even if the EU is presumably the fi rst of its kind, 
this itself does not make it unique. If ASEAN were to adopt a similar 
structure to the EU in the future that would be the end of this theory.150
Second, while readapting the theory it should also be borne in mind 
that, despite all its problems, the traditional federal theory still operates 
relatively smoothly in situations where authority is completely located at 
147 Schütze (n 51) 76.
148 ibid, 77.
149 For a detailed overview of the constitutional pluralism theory, see Miguel Poiares Madu-
ro ‘Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism’ in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komarek (eds), Consti-
tutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing 2012) 67.
150 For a more detailed criticism of the sui generis theory, see Schütze (n 22) 63.
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either the federal or national level. Parts of the theory that are not broken 
do not need fi xing and can be a good starting point for revision.
Alfred Kinsey, an American sexologist, thought the same back in 
1948 when he delivered a report that revolutionised sexual orientation 
theory. Up until then, sexual orientation was regarded through the bina-
ry homosexual-heterosexual model. Kinsley thought that such a model, 
although not entirely wrong, was incomplete. Beside there being com-
pletely homosexual and completely heterosexual people in the world, 
there was a whole spectrum of people that could not be identifi ed as ei-
ther. Together with his team, Kinsley created the so-called Kinsey scale: 
the seven-point heterosexual-homosexual rating scale.151 This marked a 
shift from the binary to the spectral understanding of sexuality. Soon 
after, such spectral understanding spilled over into many other areas 
of science dealing with human identity, such as gender or kink theory. 
Spectrum proved to be a superior tool in understanding human identity 
because it represents every possible gender, sexuality, attraction, and 
expression. It does not push people into boxes to which they do not feel 
they belong.152
What is federalism but a search for a union’s identity? Unions of 
states are of a complex legal structure which consists of various ele-
ments. One union is distinguishable from another not only because the 
sovereignty question is answered differently, but also because between 
them there is a different allocation of authority, various scope of the 
union’s competences, a different constitutional structure, etc. Each of 
these elements can be measured separately in a spectral manner to gain 
a better understanding of the union’s true legal nature. As we have seen, 
the allocation of authority can vary from the absolute authority of the 
member states to the absolute authority of the union, while the consti-
tutional structure can go from being hierarchical with the federal con-
stitution at the top, over two parallel heterarchical legal orders, to a hi-
erarchical structure with the member states’ constitutions at the top. In 
the end, a combination of these elements is what constitutes the union’s 
identity.
However, the traditional federal theory focuses only on one element 
which it still understands in a binary manner: the principle of sover-
eignty. Every other element, such as the question of authority, is either 
disregarded or is a direct binary consequence of the locus of sovereignty, 
151 Kinsey Institute <https://kinseyinstitute.org/research/publications/kinsey-scale.php> 
accessed 28 June 2020.
152  Hannah Rimm ‘We Know Sexuality Is a Spectrum: Here’s What That Looks Like & 
What It Means’ (sheknows, 15 June 2020) <www.sheknows.com/health-and-wellness/arti-
cles/1141180/sexuality-is-spectrum/> accessed 28 July 2020.
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such as the constitutional structure. I believe that the theory needs to 
look beyond this element if it wants to create a better understanding 
of unions and it needs to do this spectrally. The whole idea that sover-
eignty, a principle surrounded by much ambiguity, must defi ne the legal 
nature of the union should be abandoned. The gap that it leaves behind 
must not be fi lled with some other element instead. Rather, the multiple 
defi ning elements of unions should fi rst be identifi ed (eg the distribution 
of authority or the hierarchy of law). Then, for each element a spectrum 
should be created and correlations between different spectrums should 
be explored. Only after all of this is done should a new non-binary clas-
sifi cation, one that is not preoccupied with the principle of sovereignty, 
be forged.
Needless to say, this ‘spectral concept’ is only an idea on how we 
should approach the task of reforming a traditional federal theory, it is 
not a theory itself. Much more research and work are needed to see if 
this idea could turn into a functional federal theory.153 The aim of this 
paper was primarily to give a critique of a traditional federal theory, 
while conceptualising how exactly the theory should be reformed is left 
for another one. However, the idea to rethink traditional federal theory in 
a non-binary manner is not a new idea. Back in the 18th century, James 
Madison already gave rise to a new federal theory by rejecting a settled 
binary confederal-federal distinction.
In his famous ‘Federalist No 39’, James Madison examined the legal 
nature of the United States of America based on the 1787 Constitution by 
refusing to concentrate on the question of sovereignty. Instead, he chose 
an analytic approach by examining whether the origin and character of 
the Constitution, the composition of shared institutions and the scope 
and nature of the union’s powers are more of a national (federal) or inter-
national (confederal) character. He concluded that those elements were 
neither completely national nor international, but rather a mixture of 
both.154 Consequently, he proclaimed that the United States of America, 
based on the 1787 Constitution, was neither a confederation nor a fed-
eral state, but rather a third entity that lies between these two poles.155 
153 It was brought to my attention, by the anonymous reviewer of this article, that Olivier 
Beaud, a French expert in constitutional theory and theory of law, introduced in the book 
Théorie de la Fédération his federal theory that encompasses some of the ideas presented 
here regarding the way the traditional federal theory should be reformed. Beaud presents 
his theory in great detail and by using many historical references. For more, see Olivier 
Beaud, Théorie de la Fédération (1st edn, Presses Universitaires de France 2007). I am 
grateful to the anonymous reviewer for providing this valuable source of information.
154 James Madison, ‘Federalist No. 39’ (fi rst published 1787, New York).
155 ibid.
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Such an entity was later named ‘Federal Union’ by Tocqueville.156 In the 
light of this Madison way of thinking, the EU would be a perfect example 
of one.157
Regardless of whether one sides with Madison’s view on federalism 
or starts one’s own odyssey to fi nd a more appropriate federal theory, 
spectral or not, the starting point for a better understanding of feder-
alism stays the same. The chains of sovereignty that kept us down for 
years must be burst open.
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